Separate but Equal? John F. Kennedy, Europe and the Declaration of Interdependence by Mørk, Anne
  
 
 
 
Separate but equal? 
 John F. Kennedy, Europe, and the 
Declaration of Interdependence 
 
 
 
 By Anne Mørk 
Center for American Studies, University of Southern Denmark 
November 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intensive Program: Europe and the US in the 1960s 
John-F.-Kennedy-Institut für Nordamerikastudien 
Freie Universität Berlin  
September 12-24, 2011 
- 2 - 
 
Separate but equal? 
 John F. Kennedy, Europe, and the Declaration of Interdependence 
 
The foreign policy legacy of John F. Kennedy has largely been limited to three of the defining 
battlegrounds of the Cold War – Berlin, Vietnam, and Cuba. To many, Kennedy’s European 
policy equals Kennedy’s Berlin policy. However, his relationship with a united Europe 
represented significant part of his Cold War strategy. On July 4 1962, President Kennedy 
spoke at Independence Hall in Philadelphia. After arguing that the Declaration of 
Independence continued to inspire struggles for freedom around the world, he claimed that 
“the United States will be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence” with a united Europe. 
Kennedy also encouraged his fellow citizens “to think intercontinentally”.1 Such statements 
can be argued to be both a departure from and a continuation of American foreign policy 
traditions.  The purpose of this paper is to place John F. Kennedy’s policy towards Europe, 
particularly his 1962 Declaration of Interdependence, within the context of the historical 
traditions of isolationism and liberal intuitionalism.  
The main focus will be on the economic aspect of the Atlantic partnership, 
rather than political or military cooperation. As the purpose of and background for the 1962 
Declaration of Interdependence are explored, it becomes increasingly clear that Kennedy’s 
European policy was primarily concerned with trade. Also, Kennedy’s 1962 speech was not 
directed at European audience but was part of a campaign to convince Congress to pass the 
bill that would become the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. In fact, while Kennedy’s message of 
intercontinental interdependence served national interests rather than international ones. 
American willingness to participate in the Atlantic community and act through multilateral 
institutions suggest that American leaders had departed from the traditionally isolationist 
doctrine in America foreign policy. However, such new ideas were based on a shift in what 
was deemed necessary to protect national interest, in this case economic interests. Thus, 
American principles did not necessarily significantly change, but the global context in which 
American foreign policy was formulated did. Therefore, several frameworks can be examined 
to analyze Kennedy’s European policy: traditions of isolationism and internationalism in 
American history in general, the impact of the Cold War on these, and the beliefs and 
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principles of the Kennedy administration. Through history, Americans have generally 
assumed an isolationist position on foreign policy – paradoxically combined with a belief in 
America as a superior nation and a potential world leader in democratic principles. President 
Woodrow Wilson’s proposal for liberal institutionalism after World War I was rejected by an 
isolationist Congress, but these internationalist principles returned with the Cold War. Also, 
foreign policy is considered the responsibility of the president while certain powers lie with 
Congress, such as the approval of treaties and the power to declare war. History has shown 
presidents to be more internationalist and progressive in matters of foreign policy, whereas 
Congress represents the more conservative and cautious home front.
2
 The relationship 
between the Executive and Congress are particularly interesting in the case of Kennedy and 
the Declaration of Interdependence, since the speech coincided with Congress’ treatment of 
the Trade Expansion Act.  
 
The terms “Atlantic partnership” or “Atlantic community” will both be used to describe the 
American-European relationship in this paper. According to some political leaders at the time, 
“partnership” referred to the relationship between the US and Europe as a united, single actor 
(mostly for economic purposes) and “community” referred to the bilateral relationship 
between the US and the various European states (primarily on NATO matters).
3
 However, 
many current scholars do not make the distinction between the two, and the approach is 
continued here.  
 
Isolationism, unilateralism, and the national interest 
In 1796, George Washington decided to leave the presidency after two terms. His Farewell 
Address became a founding document in American politics in issues defining much of 
American foreign policy for most of the 19th century. This was an isolationist foreign policy 
defined by protection of the national interest. International engagements were seen as possible 
threats to the survival of the young American nation. Washington argued, “It is our true policy 
to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world”, and that trade 
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should be the only motivation for international relationships. Washington particularly 
presented Europe as a threat to American interests. He claimed that  
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote 
relation […] it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in 
the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and 
collisions of her friendships or enmities. 
 
Thus, Europe in particular was identified as the symbol of the Old World which represented 
conflicts and alliances potential dangerous to American interests.  
In 1901, Thomas Jefferson’s inaugural address continued in the same tradition 
as Washington’s address, yet with a significant contribution. Jefferson based his insistence on 
American isolationism on the exceptional nature and morally superiority of the American 
nation and warned that, if it became involved with “entangling alliances”, the morally and 
politically superior new nation would be drawn into the European power politics that it had 
recently escaped.
4
  
 
The early tradition of isolationism was institutionalized in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. 
Directed at European, particularly Spanish and French, interests and their potential 
intervention in South and Central America, the doctrine was part isolationist, part 
interventionist. It presented the idea of continental separation, securing the Americas from 
military and economic intervention while promising US non-intervention in Europe. A 
promise that was directed both Europeans and to appease isolationists at home. However, it 
also gave US the right to intervene when deeming necessary in the rest of the Americas. The 
Monroe Doctrine was not necessarily a result of anti-European sentiments in the new 
American nation; it was an acknowledgement of national interests in a global context.
5
 In fact, 
the formulation and success of the doctrine depended on an improving relationship with 
Britain and the belief in the global supremacy of its navy. Americans tend to remember the 
doctrine as a principled act establishing their distance from European affairs, but Walter 
Russell Mead argues that it was decided that the British interests in the area were more in 
sync with American ones, and thus America would rely on British control of the area. Another 
advantage of British supremacy in Latin America was that it prevented America from building 
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an expensive navy at a time when internal development was more in the national interest.
6
 
Only at the turn of the century did America acquire the military and naval power necessary to 
intervene unilaterally in Latin America, as seen in the addition of the Roosevelt Corollary to 
the Monroe Doctrine in 1904.  
 
Interventionism, multilateralism and liberal institutionalism 
Towards the end of the 19th century, American power had prospered economically and 
geographically to the degree that international engagements no longer seemed a threat to the 
national interest. In fact, American leaders used their supposed moral superiority to justify 
interventions in colonial struggles in Cuba and the Philippines, among others. For the first 
time, America possessed the strength and will to “defend” the Americas by themselves. 
However, it was the presidency of Woodrow Wilson that provided the significant shift in 
American foreign policy. In his “Fourteen Points speech”, Wilson had the recipe for a world 
safe for democracy and free trade. This represents the attitude that would provide the other 
tradition in American foreign policy, namely the tradition of interventionism and 
institutionalism. Especially Wilson’s proposal for the establishment of the League of Nations 
embodied new American support for the principle of collective security and liberal 
institutionalism. However, the Treaty of Versailles was rejected by the Senate due to small, 
but efficient group of isolationists in the Senate led by Republican Henry Cabot Lodge.
7
  
They feared that the League of Nations would threaten US sovereignty, and especially the 
power the British might assume over the League. Senator William Borah of Idaho opposed 
the treaty because “The League of Nations makes it necessary for America to give back to 
George V what it took away from George III.”8 Thomas Guinsberg has argued that the 
isolationist opposition to the Treaty of Versailles was not based on a wish not to participate in 
international relation, but simply the fear of “fighting other people’s battles in a strait-
jacket”.9 This relates to Walter LaFeber’s argument that isolationism in America did not 
necessarily signify indifference to international issues or the wish for limited trade, but rather 
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a wish for “the freedom to act unilaterally”.10 The result of the debate concerning the League 
of Nations was a compromise on foreign policy which implied that America would promote 
its national interests, particularly free trade, in the global arena, but would not intervene in the 
matters of other nations.
11
 Thus, the groundwork for a new internationalist principle in 
American foreign policy had been laid, but the conditions for the American public and 
political leadership to support it were missing.  
 
The Cold War  
World War II significantly changed the international setting for American foreign policy. The 
outcome of the war provided an opportunity for the three traditions of foreign policy to come 
together: the national interest of national security and economic prosperity, the belief in 
America as a morally superior nation that would serve as a role model for other nations, and 
the Wilsonian principles of liberal institutionalism and collective security. American support 
for international institutions, such as the United Nations, and collective security, as 
exemplified in NATO, signified a renewed dedication to Wilsonian ideals. But all these were 
also in the national interest of the United States. Spreading democracy and free trade would 
open markets to American goods and decrease the risk of war – i.e. reduce American military 
spending.  
 
The Cold War forced American leaders to rethink their isolationist tradition. As Pearl Harbor 
proved that the Atlantic no longer provided an automatic defense barrier against foreign 
aggression, Americans became aware of the importance of collective security. The threat from 
the Soviet Union required the defense of not just American borders, but the entire “free” 
world. Even for America, such task required international cooperation. However, two factors 
besides national security influenced Americans’ newfound willingness to participate in 
international institutions and assume a role of international leadership. First, World War II 
had left the US as an economic and military superpower and as the leader of the Western, 
capitalist system. The American sense of exceptionalism and moral superiority only 
strengthened the resolve to assume world leadership. The economic and materialistic strength 
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of the US highlighted the importance of creating new markets abroad. Americans’ newfound 
economic supremacy proved a double advantage – they needed international trade and they 
could now pursue this without having to fear the control of other nations. Second, America’s 
reluctance to participate in international institutions and contribute to collective security had 
always been based on a fear of losing sovereignty and being forced into unruly situations by 
alliances. Due to America’s newfound status as the free world’s sole superpower, American 
leaders were probably aware that the very survival and success of those institutions now relied 
fully on American leadership, and thus it was highly unlikely that the US could be forced into 
conflicts against its own will. Thus, not only did the Cold War seem to be an immediate end 
to the isolationist sentiment that had defined US foreign policy through history, but the 
newfound role of superpower seemed to combine America’s wish for internationalist 
cooperation with a traditional wish to protect national security and economic prosperity. Thus, 
it was able to use its activist, collective tendencies while also maintaining nearly complete 
control of its own military, economic and political matters. 
 
The stability of Western Europe had top priority after the war, as it was considered the first 
moral battleground between capitalism and communism. A democratic and capitalistic 
Western Europe was considered the foundation for containing communism, and its political, 
economic and cultural ties to the US made it particularly important to American interests. A 
weak and divided Europe happily accepted American support and leadership in return for 
relinquishing power to the Americans on many matters, especially military ones.
12
 However, 
by the time John F. Kennedy came into power in 1961, the balance of power between the US 
and Europe had shifted as the threat of nuclear war in Europe seemed smaller, and the 
Common Market developed into a serious competitor to American economic supremacy in 
the Western world.
13
 As any other activist, internationalist country, America was now facing 
the reality that there was a limit to its economic capabilities. In short, America at home could 
no longer afford to protect American interest abroad singlehandedly. In the words of Joseph 
Kraft in the book The Grand Design, “this country’s foreign commitments have outpaces its 
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domestic development.”14 As Europe was becoming stronger in the late 1950s, it could 
suitably take over some of the military and economic responsibilities of the US; however, this 
would require American leaders to relinquish power.  
 
 
Separate but equal? The United States and Europe 
The military, political and economic cooperation between the US and Europe was 
institutionalized with the establishment of the Marshall Plan in 1947 and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization in 1949. In the 1950s, American would quietly support further 
integration in Western Europe by supporting the establishment of the Steel and Coal Union 
and later, its successor, the European Economic Community in 1957.
15
 The concept of a 
united Europe was popular with the elites of American politics on both sides of the political 
aisle.
16
 The failure of a suggested European Defence Community (which would have been 
under American control and leadership) in 1954 created a growing split between economic 
and military aspects of Atlantic cooperation. By the time Kennedy came into office, the 
primary concern of the Americans was economic cooperation. In fact, American national 
security interests clashed with economic interests. In national security, US leaders wished for 
a strong, integrated Western Europe to contain Soviet power and, in particular, West 
Germany. Thus a potential rise in German militarism would be contained by other European 
powers while also preventing a reunification with East Germany that would almost surely 
result in a neutral state.
17
 However, a strong, integrated Europe could potentially pose an 
economic threat to American interests. Thus, American leaders had an ambivalent relationship 
with the European Economic Community as it strengthened European integration, but it could 
potentially lead to American isolation on Atlantic economic matters. Also, it was feared that a 
joint European tariff would limit trade with the Third World, thus creating social instability in 
areas which Americans considered crucial in the struggle against communism.
18
 For the US, 
the main issue was to have Great Britain accepted into the Common Market. Due to the 
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“special relationship”, it was believed that British entry would secure de facto American 
influence.
 19
 
The common phrase used by both Americans and pro-integration Europeans 
leader such as Jean Monnet to describe the Atlantic partnership was that the two pillars should 
be “separate but equal”.20 Considering that the phrase was usually employed in an American 
context to legitimize harassment and suppression of African American, its use was actually 
quite suitable for describing the Atlantic “partnership”. Americans wanted a strong and 
independent Western Europe as long as they could control it. 
On military matters, Europe was still dependent on American support and 
leadership in NATO.  This also contributed to America’s economic problems. One of the 
concerns of American leaders was the uneven balance-of-payments due to military spending 
in Europe. Military protection of Western Europe was a considerable part of American 
defense spending.
21
 As Europe prospered economically, it seemed unfair to Americans that 
they should continue to pay for European defense when the continent was no longer weak and 
divided. However, when some Europeans nations, especially France, suggested strengthening 
national rather than international defense, American objected.  
 
 
John F. Kennedy and The Grand Design 
In his 1962 State of the Union Address, Kennedy outlined the issues that would come to 
define the political year. The economy stands out as the major issue in the speech, and 
Kennedy referred to the need for a new trade expansion bill as absolutely crucial to America’s 
future success and stability. He also spoke favourably of the United Nations and mentioned 
“the united strength of the Atlantic community” as one of the “five basic sources of strength.” 
Kennedy argued that military concerns in Europe were being replaced by economic ones, 
particularly due to the growth of the Common Market. However, he argued that a new 
favourable trade act was the only way to secure a Common Market accessible to American 
                                                 
19
 Costigliola 1989 p. 26 
20
 Schlesinger p. 72. The phrase is also used in Joseph Kraft’s The Grand Design 
21
 Costigliola 1989 p. 26 
- 10 - 
 
goods.
22
 Thus, John F. Kennedy’s objectives for an Atlantic partnership/community was 
primary economic. 
Kennedy’s under secretary of state for economic affairs, George Ball, noted, 
even before Kennedy’s inauguration, that “we shall be able to keep […] our hopes for a 
prosperous and secure Free World only if we swiftly move to develop a new set of economic 
policies in common with our allies”.23 Thus, Kennedy’s goal was to redefine the Atlantic 
partnership to counteract the shifting power balance between the US and Europe and to 
convince/force Europeans to pay their share of military expenses in the Cold War. In the 1961 
Acheson Report, which defined the Kennedy administration’s goals on European policy, it 
was openly admitted that the goal of a new partnership was not to change American policy, 
but to increase control over Western Europe.
24
 
 
The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (RTA), which had defined American international trade 
since 1934, would expire in 1962. Due to rising isolationism in Congress, Kennedy decided to 
present its replacement, the Trade Expansion Act, immediately in 1962.
25
 The Dillon Round 
at the GATT conference from May 1961 to January 1962 had been particularly troublesome 
due to the few options for negotiations in the RTA – this only convinced Kennedy and his 
advisers that new legislation was necessary and that this should give the president far greater 
powers in negotiating trade barriers.
26
  Within the Kennedy administration, a conflict arose 
concerning which department should define the politics of the Great Design. George Ball and 
the internationalist State Department clashed with the isolationist Commerce Department.
27
 
Eventually, the internationalist, pro-free trade George Ball was given control over much of 
European affairs, especially since Secretary of State Dean Rusk had very little interest in the 
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topic despite being staunchly pro-European , as were the president and most of his advisors.
28
 
Ball was instrumental in the formulation of the Trade Expansion Act, and it came to reflect 
his Wilsonian ideals of free trade and institutionalism.
29
 
Kennedy sent the Trade Expansion Act to Congress in January 1962, and soon 
the bill was fused in the minds of many with the concept of an Atlantic Partnership.
30
 When 
introducing the bill to Congress, President Kennedy emphasized the domestic importance of a 
new trade act considering that the country had faced three recessions in seven years.
31
  While 
he emphasized international institutionalism, he also reminded members of Congress that 
economic cooperation was in fact a matter of national security in the Cold War. He argued, 
“An integrated Western Europe, joined in trading partnership with the United States, will 
further shift the world balance of power to the side of freedom.”32 Kennedy did not only 
present the bill as an economic measure, but an important tool in the Cold War. Thus, 
American prosperity and European stability were central to the continued struggle against 
communism.  
 
President Kennedy presented his Declaration of Interdependence speech on July 4, 1962. 
Ironically, for a speech on US-European relations, no European leaders were in the audience. 
Kennedy had a clear domestic agenda for his July 4 speech. It is no coincidence that 
Kennedy’s 1962 speech primarily mentioned economic cooperation and to a lesser degree 
political and military matters. He was appealing to a potentially isolationist Congress that an 
Atlantic partnership was in the interest of American economic interest. He stated that  
We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the 
common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, 
of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving 
problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing coordinated 
policies in all economic, political, and diplomatic areas. We see in such a 
Europe a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the 
great burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free 
nations.
33
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By focusing on Europe carrying part of the burden, President Kennedy addressed the concerns 
of Congress and interest groups due to European growth, thereby assuring them that a strong 
Europe would not be a rival but rather a partner to share the (economic) burden of leading the 
free world. Thus, the congressional vote on the bill would in fact be on Kennedy’s vision for a 
Grand Design. The increasing demand from various political groups and interest 
organizations that Europeans should share their part of the burden in the Cold War, was not 
necessarily based on a wish to lesser American engagement in international affairs.
34
  
 
In 1962, columnist Joseph Kraft released the book The Grand Design which presented the 
specifics of renewed Atlantic partnerships and how such an arrangement would strengthen 
both Europe and America. Kraft claimed that the book was not the official program of the 
Kennedy administration, but he had consulted with several high ranking officials in the 
administration when writing the book.
35
 The Grand Design was intended as a redefinition of 
the Atlantic relationship – particularly designed to suit American needs. Indeed, Kraft 
suggested that the Grand Design would take its place next to NATO and the Marshall Plan as 
“another spectacular leap in this country’s remarkable transit from isolation to international 
commitment.”36 However, the Grand Design and the Kennedy administration faced a problem 
that the Truman administration and its internationalist projects had not: a strong, independent-
minded Europe which had no intention of letting the US continue to set the agenda. 
Particularly French leader Charles de Gaulle was a proponent of this newfound independence. 
The primary objective of the Grand Design was economic prosperity with military and 
political cooperation; this suggests that Americans did indeed feel its economic supremacy 
threatened, but not its military or political control.  
 
For Europeans, increased economic independence contributed to the wish for military control 
as well. The decreasing fear in Western Europe of a Soviet nuclear attack was weakening the 
Europeans’ sense of inferiority and subordination to American control. Generally, the post-
war Atlantic relationship was defined by cooperation and consultation in principle, but 
American dominance in reality. Especially in military/NATO matters - an example was the 
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Cuban Missile Crisis in which the European allies were kept in the dark - Americans 
considered European concerns to be secondary.
37
 Despite Kennedy’s wish for a Grand 
Design, his European allies generally felt that he ignored them in the decision-making process 
and was far less cooperative then Eisenhower.
38
 Kennedy’s military doctrine of flexible 
response made some European leaders worry whether Americans would actually deploy 
nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe. In response, the French wished for their own 
nuclear capabilities. Americans instead suggested a Multilateral Force (the MLF) that would 
consists of a multilateral/NATO fleet of ships armed with nuclear missiles – under American 
control, obviously.
39
 
 
The Trade Expansion Act was the major legislative event of 1962, yet it passed Congress 
convincingly, 78-8 in the Senate and 298-125 in the House of Representatives.
40
 However, 
Kennedy’s hopes for an Atlantic community were sabotaged by Charles de Gaulle. In January 
1963, de Gaulle gave a speech in which he efficiently put an end to American hopes for 
greater cooperation across the Atlantic. First, he vetoed the acceptance of Great Britain into 
the Common Market. Second, he denounced the MLF. Both issues were discredited due to it 
being, according to de Gaulle, another scheme for American domination of European 
affairs.
41
 Without French cooperation, Kennedy had little chance of fulfilling the dream of a 
Grand Design. After de Gaulle’s statements, Kennedy abandoned the idea of a redefinition of 
the Atlantic community and instead focused on specific initiatives, such as the MLF and the 
Kennedy Round at the GATT conference at which the Trade Expansion Act was used to 
reduce tariffs.
42
  
In 1963, Kennedy and several of his advisors abandoned the Eurocentric 
approach to foreign relations that had defined the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. 
During his time as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate, JFK had 
shown greater interest in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia than Europe. With Cold 
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War struggles in Laos and Vietnam calling for his attention, Kennedy’s interest in European 
affairs decreased in 1963.
43
 
 
President Kennedy’s 1962 Declaration of Interdependence and his request for an Atlantic 
partnership can seem rather distant from the isolationist rhetoric frequently heard through 
American history. However, Kennedy – and American leaders throughout the Cold War – was 
reluctant to relinquish power in an Atlantic partnership, and thus the rhetoric of community 
was in fact a tool of domestic politics for legislative purposes. Despite, the internationalist 
approach of Kennedy’s foreign policy, his primary concerns was still to protect American 
interests, particularly in the field of trade.  Kennedy struggled with the paradox of being a 
superpower with strong national interests and the wish to be a member of the international 
community with its demands of compromise, cooperation and possible loss of sovereignty. He 
had to appeal to his domestic supporters in order to work with international allies. When faced 
with the choice between national interest and the international community, Kennedy chose 
national interest. Thus, in this case, Kennedy’s wish for an Atlantic community can be 
interpreted as a wish to consolidate American power rather than a legitimate wish for liberal 
institutionalism. 
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